Fragility of reputation and clustering of risk-taking by Guillermo L. Ordoñez
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Research Department Staff Report 431
July 2009
Fragility of Reputation and Clustering of Risk-Taking ∗
Guillermo L. Ordo˜ nez
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis and Yale University
ABSTRACT ———————————————————————————————————-
Concerns about constructing and maintaining good reputations are known to reduce borrow-
ers’ excessive risk-taking. However, I ﬁnd that the self-discipline induced by these concerns
is fragile, and can break down without obvious changes in economic fundamentals. Further-
more, in the aggregate, breakdowns are clustered among borrowers with intermediate and
good reputations, which can exacerbate an economy’s weakness and contribute to a broad
economic crisis. These results come from an aggregate dynamic global game analysis of rep-
utation formation in credit markets. The selection of a unique equilibrium is accomplished
by assuming that borrowers have incomplete information about economic fundamentals.
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The major ﬁnancial crisis that began in 2008 seems to contradict our understanding of the
self-disciplining nature of ﬁnancial markets. In these markets, borrowers whose actions and
proﬁts are not observable tend to take excessive risk when compared to the efﬁcient bench-
mark in which their actions are observable. The reason is that, by taking risks, borrowers can
appropriate most of the extra beneﬁts expected from large successes and, by defaulting, can
impose to lenders most of the losses expected from large failures. However, since the 1980s,
researchers (Stiglitz and Weiss (1983), Diamond (1989)) have established that borrowers’ con-
cerns about constructing and maintaining good reputations restrain their tendency to behave
opportunistically. Yet as housing prices shot up over the few years before 2008, ﬁnancial in-
termediaries - even well-known, highly rated, reputable ones - began borrowing heavily in
order to turn around and lend heavily to high-risk customers for mortgages and other assets.
Once the housing bubble burst, that risky behavior led to a collapse in many large ﬁnancial
ﬁrms as well as in money markets and eventually in general economic activity.
U.S. Federal Reserve chairman, Ben Bernanke, has pointed to the collapse in the ﬁnancial
market discipline as the main source of the crisis: ”Market discipline has in some cases bro-
ken down, and the incentives to follow prudent lending procedures have, at times, eroded”
(Statement, Board of Governors, December 18, 2007). Why did ﬁnancial market discipline
fail in this way? Why did ﬁrms’ concerns about gaining and maintaining good reputations
apparently disappear and lead to the recent crisis? This paper constitutes a ﬁrst attempt to
understand the relation between the self-discipline of ﬁnancial markets and the economic
fundamentals affecting them.
I argue that ﬁrms’ concerns about their reputations can have negative as well as positive
aggregate effects. These concerns, I show, are, in fact, fragile and their breakdown induces
a sudden change in risk-taking behavior in response to small and not obvious changes in
aggregate fundamentals. Furthermore, these breakdowns are clustered among ﬁrms with
intermediate and good reputations, generating a large change in aggregate risk-taking be-
havior and a large negative impact on overall economic outcomes, such as corporate rates of
success and failures, credit conditions, interest rates, and returns to investors. Historically,
then, the loss of reputation concerns may have been an unnoticed ampliﬁer of ﬁnancial crises
characterized by excessive risk-taking, such as the recent one.
I establish this in a way that has not been done before. I begin with a standard model of
credit markets in which ﬁrms borrow to produce. In this model, all ﬁrms can invest in risky
projects, while only some of them (strategic ﬁrms) can also invest in safer projects that in-
crease the probability that the ﬁrm continues operating - and hence reduce the probability
1of loan default - but generate lower proﬁts when the ﬁrm continues. A ﬁrm’s reputation is
deﬁned in my model as the probability that the ﬁrm is strategic. Reputation is updated by
lenders after observing the ﬁrm’s continuation, which is an observable signal correlated with
the ﬁrm’s decisions. Strategic ﬁrms want to distinguish themselves from nonstrategic ones so
that they can pay lower interest rates in the future. The fear of losing reputation, therefore,
leads strategic ﬁrms to reduce risk-taking.
In this setting, ﬁrms’ temptation to take risks varies monotonically with a stochastic aggregate
fundamental. As is standard, however, it turns out that when fundamentals are perfectly
observable, the model delivers multiple equilibria, the characterization of which varies with
lenders’ beliefs about ﬁrms’ behavior. There is a range of this fundamental for which two
equilibria coexist. At the one extreme, if lenders believe that all strategic ﬁrms play it safe,
then ﬁrms do that. Firms know that in this case their continuation and loan repayment will
be attributed at least partly to their good behavior, thereby improving their reputation. At the
other extreme, if lenders believe that all ﬁrms take risks, then strategic ﬁrms do that. Under
these beliefs, ﬁrms know that their continuation and repayment will be attributed solely to
good luck and won’t improve their reputation at all. Reputation concerns clearly reduce risk-
taking in the ﬁrst equilibrium but not in the second.
In order to obtain a unique equilibrium, which is robust to small perturbations of information,
I here use techniques from the global games literature. I assume that after negotiating the
loan, but before making a decision about risky or safe behavior, ﬁrms observe a noisy signal
of the fundamental, which becomes part of what determines their decisions. The model thus
becomes a nonstandard dynamic global game in which strategic complementarities are not
just assumed, but are rather obtained endogenously from the concerns behind reputation
formation. Uniqueness of equilibrium is characterized for each kind of reputation by a cutoff
in signals about fundamentals, below which ﬁrms decide to take risks. Fundamentals, that
is, do not only affect the temptation but also become a coordination device for risk-taking
behavior.
Here equilibrium selection generates the ﬁrst of two sources of reputation fragility. When,
based on its signal about economic fundamentals, a ﬁrm believes that similar ﬁrms will take
risks, it also believes that lenders will assign a low probability of good behavior to all ﬁrms,
hence playing it safe will not be rewarded with a better reputation and the ﬁrm takes risks. If
signals about fundamentals are precise, small changes of fundamentals around the cutoff of
risk-taking produce a clustering of behavior among ﬁrms with the same reputation.
The second source of fragility exists at an aggregate level when ﬁrms with different reputa-
tion are compared. This source of fragility is independent of the equilibrium selection and
depends only on primitive learning properties. Safe projects have higher probabilities of con-
2tinuation, which generates two types of incentives for safe behavior. One type, continuation
incentives, increases with reputation; ﬁrms with better reputations face lower rates in the
future, have higher expected future proﬁts, and are more afraid to die. The other type, rep-
utation formation incentives, is low for extreme reputations and high for intermediate ones;
because of learning, priors are harder to change at the extremes. By combining these two
types of incentives, we can see that:
• Poor reputation ﬁrms have no incentives to play it safe because their continuation value
is low and, if they survive, their reputation cannot improve much.
• Intermediate reputation ﬁrms do have incentives to play it safe, not because their con-
tinuation value is high; rather, if they survive, they can improve their reputation a lot.
• Good reputation ﬁrms also have incentives to play it safe, but not because they can
improve their reputation if they survive; rather, their continuation value is high and
they can lose a lot if they die.
Hence, intermediate and good reputation ﬁrms have similar cutoffs for different reasons.
They switch to risk-taking under similar conditions, which produces a clustering of behavior
change among them. Furthermore, since the distribution of reputation is biased toward in-
termediate and good reputations, what these ﬁrms do strongly affects the aggregate level of
risk-taking in the economy.
My work here primarily combines two strands of literature: reputation and global games.
With regard to the reputation strand, my model is most closely related to the models of Di-
amond (1989) and Mailath and Samuelson (2001), who analyze the ability of reputation to
deter opportunistic behavior in the presence of both adverse selection and moral hazard.
Unlike their work, which is focused on reputation incentives for a single agent living in a
state-invariant environment, my work here explicitly introduces a cross section of ﬁrms in an
environment that evolves stochastically in order to study the interplay between reputation
incentives and economic conditions in determining aggregate behavior. As in their work, my
model also has multiple equilibria. While Diamond (1989) considers extreme equilibria and
Mailath and Samuelson (2001) focus on the most efﬁcient one, I select a unique equilibrium
by exploiting the existence of fundamentals as a coordination device. Finally, unlike in the
work of Mailath and Samuelson (2001), here ﬁrms’ behavior affects the probability of their
continuation, a signal to update reputation, and unlike Diamond’s (1989) model, mine is ﬂex-
ible enough to include the use of additional signals correlated to actions, which breaks the
perfect correlation between age and reputation that he obtains.
My work also contributes to the literature of herding behavior generated by reputation con-
cerns. While the work pioneered by Scharfstein and Stein (1990) considers agents that mimic
3others and disregard private information, ﬁrms in my model cannot observe others’ actions
and instead use private information to coordinate behavior.
My work relies as well on the dynamic global games literature - such as the work of Morris
and Shin (2003), Chassang (2007), and Toxvaerd (2007) - but I exploit novel properties coming
from the endogenous reputational generation of strategic complementarities. In particular,
the range of fundamentals with multiple equilibria depends on the initial reputation of the
ﬁrm, and this is useful in characterizing the schedule of cutoffs for different kinds of reputa-
tion. My work contributes, as well, to the scarce literature on learning in global games. While
most of that literature studies situations in which players learn about a policymaker or a sta-
tus quo (as in, for example, the 2006 and 2007 work of Angeletos, Hellwig and Pavan), my
model deals with the opposite situation, in which the market learns about players’ types and
so generates coordination problems. My work here is the ﬁrst to exploit fundamental-driven
incentives to create a reputation global game and select a unique equilibrium.
In the next section, I show how, with incomplete information about economic fundamentals,
a dynamic global game analysis of reputation formation in credit markets delivers a unique
equilibrium. In Section 3, I show that ﬁrms’ concerns about reputation can have substantial
aggregate negative as well as positive effects. In Section 4, I conclude.
2 Selecting a Unique Reputation Equilibrium in Credit Markets
Models of credit markets have been used to analyze the effects of reputation concerns before.
However, based on complete information about aggregate economic conditions, their results
have not been determined by a unique equilibrium. Introducing small perturbations on the
information about those conditions, I am able to select here a unique equilibrium.
2.1 Multiple Equilibria in a Model with Complete Information
First, I demonstrate the standard result that a model with complete information has multiple
equilibria.
2.1.1 The Model
Here I describe my basic model of reputation concerns in credit markets, the timing of its
events, and the deﬁnition of its equilibrium.
4a) Description
Credit markets are composed of a continuum of long-lived, risk-neutral ﬁrms (with mass 1)
and an inﬁnite number of risk-neutral lenders that provide funds to those ﬁrms.
Each ﬁrm in the model runs a unique project, by selecting either safe (s) or risky (r) produc-
tion technologies.1 I assume that ﬁrms using safe technologies are more likely to continue
operating in the market (c).
Assumption 1 The selection of a safe technology makes a ﬁrm’s continuation more likely. This is,
Pr(c|s) = ps > Pr(c|r) = pr.
If the ﬁrm does not continue, or dies, then current and future cash ﬂows are zero. If the ﬁrm
continues, then current cash ﬂows (Π) depend both on the technology used and on a single-
dimensional variable θ ∈ R that represents aggregate economic fundamentals. I assume the
relationship between the fundamental and the temptation to play it safe is positive.
Assumption 2 Safe technologies are more tempting with higher θ: ∂Πs
∂θ > ∂Πr
∂θ for all θ.
Fundamentals θ are independently and identically distributed over time and distributed with
density v(θ), mean µ, and standard deviation γ at each period. What actually matters in
Assumption 2 is not the direction of the inequality, but the monotonic change in incentives to
use safe technologies as fundamentals vary.2
The model has two types of ﬁrms, deﬁned by their access to production technologies. Strate-
gic ﬁrms S can choose between safe and risky technologies. Risky ﬁrms R can use only risky
technologies. Firm’s reputation is deﬁned by φ = Pr(S), the probability of being a strategic
ﬁrm.3
1I will also use these terms interchangeably: playing it safe or taking safe actions (s) and taking risks or taking
risky actions (r).
2Unlike in other reputation models, in this one incentives differ over the cycle. A good example is a construc-
tion ﬁrm, in which risky technology is the use of cheap materials and θ is the relative price of cheap materials.
Another example of θ is the level of aggregate demand when more structure is imposed into the deﬁnition of cash
ﬂows. This extension is available in Ordonez (2008). A ﬁnal example, related to the recent ﬁnancial crisis, in which
the direction of the assumption reverses, is ﬁnancial institutions whose risky technology is to extend mortgages
to risky households and θ is the expected housing price.
3The introduction of these two types of ﬁrms is based on my (maybe pessimistic) belief that all ﬁrms can take
risks, but not all of them can play it safe. While all ﬁrms can perform trial-error procedures, not all of them have
access to well-designed procedures. Particularly in lending markets, saying that some ﬁrms are restricted to using
inferior technologies rather than superior ones seems to be a better description of reality. An obvious alternative
is that nonstrategic ﬁrms have access to only safe technologies. In this case the main result of reputation fragility
remains unchanged. Another way to rationalize our assumption of types is that some strategic ﬁrms have a
positive discount factor, while others (risky ones) have a zero discount factor.
5To run a project, each ﬁrm needs external funds (normalized to one per period), which can
be provided by lenders, whose outside option is an alternative investment in a risk-free bond
that pays R > 1.4 Failure to repay loans (default) is characterized by a costly state veriﬁcation
with a bankruptcy process that destroys the value of the ﬁrm’s output. This is a straightfor-
ward way to introduce truth-telling by ﬁrms. When cash ﬂows are greater than debts, ﬁrms
always ﬁnd it optimal to repay loans and get the positive differential rather than default and
ﬁle for bankruptcy. I assume that, conditional on continuation, ﬁrms can always pay back
their loans; hence, default occurs only if a ﬁrm dies.5 Finally, I restrict the analysis to the use
of short-term debt, ruling out equity contracts.6
b) Timing
This model is repeated during a ﬁnite number of periods. The order of events in each period
t is the same in all periods. In what follows I focus on the reputational game in a given period
t, hence there is no need to use subscripts to denote time. In Section 2.2.2 I study the full-
ﬂedged repeated game and introduce explicitly dynamic considerations, denoting periods by
the subscript t. The timing in each period is as follows.
• Firms and lenders meet. Each lender observes the reputation φ of the ﬁrm it is matched
to. The ﬁrm acquires a loan of 1 at a rate that depends on its reputation, R(φ) > 1.
• Fundamentals θ (that affect short-term cash ﬂows) are realized by ﬁrms and lenders.7
• Strategic ﬁrms decide between using safe (s) or risky (r) technologies. Risky ﬁrms just
use risky ones (r).
• Production occurs, and the ﬁrms either continue or die.
• If the ﬁrm dies, it defaults on its loan. If the ﬁrm continues, it pays to lenders the
negotiated debt R(φ) > 1 and consumes the remaining cash ﬂows.8
4Since lenders are the long side of the market, there is no competition for funds. The introduction of such
competition makes reputation effects more important and magniﬁes the results. Other alternative assumptions
are that fundamentals do not only affect cash ﬂows (Π), but also the probability of continuation (ps) and/or the
risk-free interest rate (R). These alternatives do not modify my main results either.
5Nothing fundamental changes with this assumption, but it simpliﬁes the notation and eases the exposition.
Relaxing it, so that default also exists in case of continuation, does not change the results.
6I rule out equity contracts for two reasons. One is that short-term debt not only seems to be widely used
in reality but also it better highlights the importance of reputation concerns. The other reason is that the opti-
mal lending contracts make interest rates conditional on fundamentals. When this contract does not eliminate
excessive risk-taking completely, reputation concerns still exist and their incentives are also fragile.
7The timing in which fundamentals are observed will be relevant later in selecting a unique equilibrium. An
alternative, and possibly more realistic, assumption is that a subset of fundamentals is observed before the loan,
while another subset is observed after the loan but before production.
8Allowing forasset accumulation wouldintroducenot onlyan additional signalbut also anadditional decision
between asking for the loan or not. This is an interesting extension, but beyond my scope here.
6• Lenders do not observe the ﬁrm’s type, action, or cash ﬂow, just its continuation. They
then update the ﬁrm’s reputation from φ to φ0.
c) Preliminaries
Before formally deﬁning the equilibrium of this model, I discuss the properties of reputation
updating and the deﬁnition of the value function that ﬁrms maximize.
First, a few preliminaries about the behavior of strategic ﬁrms. Deﬁne x(φ,θ) as the probabil-
ity that a ﬁrm with reputation φ that observes fundamentals θ takes risks. I focus on equilibria
in cutoff strategies, in which a ﬁrm with reputation φ decides to take risks if it observes funda-
mentals below a certain cutoff point, k∗(φ) and play it safe if it observes fundamentals above





0 if θ > k∗(φ)
1 if θ < k∗(φ)
. (1)
i) Reputation Updating
When updating a ﬁrm’s reputation, lenders have a prior belief about the ﬁrm’s reputation
and an expectation about the ﬁrm’s behavior.
First, I restrict attention to Markovian strategies, such that the sufﬁcient statistic about the
ﬁrm’s type (strategic or risky) is the lenders’ prior belief of the ﬁrm’s reputation level φ.
This restriction allows the elimination of many equilibria, standard in models with public
signals, that require an implausible degree of coordination between the ﬁrm’s behavior and
the lender’s beliefs about the ﬁrm’s behavior. The restriction also allows the elimination of
equilibria in which reputation is not an asset, as we typically observe in reality.10
Second, even though I am restricting attention to Markovian strategies, reputation formation
still depends on beliefs about the ﬁrm’s actions. Let b x(φ,θ) be lenders’ beliefs about the prob-
ability that a strategic ﬁrm with reputation φ takes risks when the fundamental is θ. Given
cutoff strategies from equation (1), b x(φ,θ) is pinned down by b k(φ), the lenders’ beliefs about
the cutoff that ﬁrms φ follow.
9I restrict attention to this strategy given the monotonicity Assumption 2. In Section 2.1.2, I show that in this
family of strategies a multiplicity of equilibria exists when the information about fundamentals is complete. In
Section 2.2.1 I show that introducing noise into the observation of fundamentals, the unique equilibrium which
survives iterated deletion of dominated strategies (as the noise goes to zero) is a cutoff strategy of this type.
10One of these equilibria can be, for example, to play it safe for certain fundamentals until the ﬁrst bad result
happens and then take risks forever afterward. In this particular equilibrium, reputation does not exist as I have
interpreted it, and beliefs about ﬁrms’ behavior require implausible degrees of complexity and coordination. See
the discussion in the 2006 work of Mailath and Samuelson.
7UsingBayes’rule, weknowthatafterobservingacontinuingﬁrm, lendersupdatereputations
this way:
Pr(S|c) = φ0(φ, b x) =
[prb x + ps(1 − b x)]φ
[prb x + ps(1 − b x)]φ + pr(1 − φ)
, (2)
where φ0 is the ﬁrm’s posterior reputation after the observation that the ﬁrm has continued.
Note that, for φ ∈ (0,1), φ0 = φ when b x = 1 and φ0 > φ when b x < 1, with the gap between
the new and old reputation (φ0 − φ) increasing as b x goes to 0. Graphically, ﬁrms reputation
evolves as in Figure 1. Reputation priors φ are represented on the horizontal axis; reputation
posteriors φ0 on the vertical axis. For any prior φ, we can say three things.
• If lenders believe strategic ﬁrms play it safe for sure (that is, if b x = 0), then the gap φ0−φ
represents the gains to the ﬁrm from continuation, in terms of reputation.
• If lenders believe strategic ﬁrms take risks for sure (that is, if b x = 1), then φ0 = φ and
ﬁrms get no gains in terms of reputation.
• Regardless of b x, the updating is weak when priors are strong (that is, close to φ = 0 or
φ = 1). In particular, regardless of b x, φ0 = φ for φ = 0 and φ = 1. The maximum gap,
(φ0 − φ) is obtained at some intermediate level, like φM.
























φ   1 0
1 Updating ( ˆ 0 x = ) 
Updating ( ˆ 1 x = )







Reputation before continuation 
ii) Continuation Values
For now, I will focus on a ﬁrm’s single period problem, when it faces exogenously ﬁxed ex-
pected continuation values V(φ), one for each reputation φ. These values are characterized
by three properties: They are well-deﬁned, they are positive (since proﬁts are bounded below
8by zero), and they are monotonically increasing in the reputation level φ (since reputation is
a valuable asset).11
Total discounted proﬁts for a ﬁrm with reputation φ, that observes a fundamental θ, condi-
tional on taking risks with probability x(φ,θ) and lenders’ beliefs about the cutoff b k(φ), are,
e V (φ,θ|x,b k) = x [pr[Πr(θ) − R(φ|b k)] + βprV(φ0
(φ,b x|b k))] (3)
+(1 − x)[ps[Πs(θ) − R(φ|b k)] + βpsV(φ0
(φ,b x|b k))],
where β is the discount factor. This allows us to deﬁne
V (φ,θ|b k) = max
x∈[0,1]




−∞ V (φ0,θ0|b k0)v(θ0)dθ0 is the expected continuation value for φ0, an element
of a given stream of expected continuation values Υ0 = {V(φ0)}1
φ0=0.
d) Equilibrium
Now, I formally deﬁne the model’s equilibrium in a given period, for any arbitrary stream
of expected continuation values. Hence, each variable should have a subscript t. To simplify
notation, I am not including it.
Deﬁnition 1 A single period Markov perfect equilibrium in cutoff strategies, for a given stream of
expected continuation values Υ0 = {V(φ0)}1
φ0=0, consists of risk-taking cutoffs k∗(φ), interest rates
R(φ), and posteriors φ0, for each φ, such that
• Eachﬁrmwithreputationφthatobservesfundamentalθ choosesx∗(φ,θ)tomaximize e V (φ,θ|x,b k)
(as in (3)) following a cutoff strategy k∗(φ) (as in (1)).
• Lenders charge R(φ) to obtain the risk-free rate R in expectation.
• Posteriors φ0 are updated using Bayes’ rule (using (2)).
• A strategy for a ﬁrm with reputation φ uniquely determines the equilibrium interest rate and the
updating rule that lenders must use if their beliefs are to be correct (that is, if b k(φ) = k∗(φ)).
The equilibrium in a game in which ﬁrms live for a ﬁnite time T and VT+1(φ) = 0, for all φ,
(now explicitly differentiating each period by a subscript t) is as follows:
11I show later, when solving the complete dynamic model, that these properties hold in equilibrium.
9Deﬁnition 2 A ﬁnite-horizon Markov perfect equilibrium in cutoff strategies consists of a sequence
of risk-taking cutoffs {k∗
t(φ)}T
t=0, interest rates {Rt(φ)}T
t=0, posteriors φ0, and ﬁrm continuation val-
ues {Vt(φ)}T
t=0, for each φ, such that














a multiplicity of Markovian perfect equilibria exists in monotone cutoff strategies in each
period. First I discuss properties of the ﬁrms’ differential gains from taking safe actions rather
than risky ones, which characterize each ﬁrm’s decisions. Then I show how these properties
interact with lenders’ beliefs about the ﬁrms’ actions to create multiplicity of equilibria. I
begin analyzing multiplicity in a single period and then I show how it extends to multiplicity
in the whole ﬁnite horizon game as well.
a) Differential Gains from Safe Actions
Deﬁne by ∆(φ,θ|b k) = e V (φ,θ|0,b k) − e V (φ,θ|1,b k) the differential gains to ﬁrms from playing it
safe rather than taking risks when a ﬁrm with reputation φ observes a fundamental θ, condi-
tional on cutoff beliefs b k(φ) (and, hence, beliefs b x(φ,θ) about risk-taking for each θ). Naturally,
a ﬁrm decides to play it safe if ∆(φ,θ|b k) > 0 and takes risks if ∆(φ,θ|b k) < 0.







(ps − pr)R(φ|b k)
+β[ps − pr][V(φ0




Equation (4) displays the four essential components of these differential gains:
• Short-Term refers to differential gains in expected short-term cash ﬂows to the ﬁrm from
using a safe technology. This is the only part of the differential gains that depends on θ,
and it drives the relative temptation to take risks.
• Continuation captures the effect that, taking safe actions increases the probability of the
ﬁrm’s continuation.
10• Moral Hazard represents the ﬁrm’s incentives to take risks in order to reduce the proba-
bility of having to pay back the debt. This component is the one that generates excessive
risk-taking.
• Reputation Formation refers to the fact that taking safe actions also increases the prob-
ability of reputation improvement.
The following lemma shows that playing it safe is less tempting for ﬁrms as fundamentals
and lenders’ beliefs of safe actions decline:
Lemma 1 A ﬁrm’s differential gains from playing it safe, ∆(φ,θ|b k), is monotonically increasing in
fundamentals θ and monotonically not increasing in risk-taking beliefs, b k and b x.









∂b k ≤ 0.
Since loans are negotiated before fundamentals are known, interest rates are deﬁned by the






Pr(c|φ,b k) = (1 − φ)pr + φ
h
prV(b k) + ps(1 − V(b k))
i
,
with V(b k) being the cumulative distribution of fundamentals up to b k or the ex ante believed
probability of risk-taking by ﬁrms with reputation φ. Since ps > pr, it is straightforward to
show that
∂R(φ|b k)
∂b k ≥ 0.
• Step 3:
∂∆(φ,θ|b k)
∂b x ≤ 0.
From equation (2), we know that
∂(φ0−φ)
∂b x ≤ 0 (and strictly negative for φ ∈ (0,1)). By assump-
tion (for now),12 V(φ) is monotonically increasing in φ, hence,
∂(V(φ0)−V(φ))
∂b x ≤ 0. Even when I
discuss the effects of b k and b x separately, recall that pessimistic lenders (those with high b k(φ))
will not update reputation for a wider range of fundamentals (since b x(φ,θ) = 1 for θ < b k(φ)).
Q.E.D.
12I show later (Section 2.2.2) this assumption holds in equilibrium.
11b) Multiplicity
Now I turn to how this relationship between ﬁrms’ differential gains from playing it safe and
lenders’ beliefs about their behavior creates a multiplicity of equilibria in this model. But
before, I assume uniform limit dominance , which deﬁnes ranges of fundamentals for which,
regardless of beliefs, ﬁrms decide to either take risks (fundamentals below a lower bound θ)
or play it safe (fundamentals above an upper bound θ).
Assumption 3 (Uniform Limit Dominance)
• For each φ and b k, there is a lower bound θ(φ|b k) such that ∆(φ,θ|b k, b x = 0) = 0
• For each φ and b k, there is an upper bound θ(φ|b k) such that ∆(φ,θ|b k, b x = 1) = 0
A pair of reputation φ and cutoff beliefs b k, determines an interest rate R(φ|b k). From equation
(4) we know that θ(φ|b k) is the level of fundamentals that makes ﬁrms indifferent between
playing it safe and taking risks when b x = 0 is artiﬁcially assigned to all θ, regardless of b k.
Similarly, θ(φ|b k) is the level of fundamentals for ﬁrm indifference when b x = 1 is artiﬁcially
assigned to all θ. For example, θ(φ| − ∞) is the indifference θ for ﬁrms φ given R(φ| − ∞) =
R
pr(1−φ)+psφ and b x = 0. Similarly, θ(φ|∞) is the indifference θ for ﬁrms φ given R(φ|∞) = R
pr
and b x = 1.
The following lemma characterizes these bounds. The proof follows from inspecting equation
(4), using lemma 1 and assumption 3.
Lemma 2 • θ(φ|b k) ≤ θ(φ|b k) for all b k ∈ R (strictly < for φ ∈ (0,1)).
• −∞ < θ(φ| − ∞) ≤ θ(φ|b k) and θ(φ|b k) ≤ θ(φ|∞) < ∞ for all b k ∈ R.
The next Proposition formalizes the multiplicity of equilibria in this model. The proof is in
the Appendix.
Proposition 1 (Equilibria Multiplicity)
For all reputation levels φ ∈ (0,1), there is a continuum of equilibrium strategy cutoffs k∗(φ). These
strategies are located in a range [θ∗(φ),θ
∗
(φ)] where its bounds are given by the ﬁxed-point funda-




, b x = 1) = 0. There is a unique range
[θ∗(φ),θ
∗







R(ps−pr)2 for all θ ∈ R. Only for reputation levels φ = 0
and φ = 1, is there a unique equilibrium cutoff, k∗(0) and k∗(1), respectively.
12Figure 2 provides a graphical intuition of this multiplicity. Consider a particular risk-taking
cutoff k∗(φ) for some ﬁrm with reputation φ ∈ (0,1), such that k∗(φ) ∈ [θ(φ|k∗),θ(φ|k∗)].
Then, the equilibrium differential gain ∆(φ,θ|k∗) for different levels of fundamentals is the
bold function with a discrete jump at k∗(φ). This is an equilibrium because it is a best response
for any realization of the fundamental θ such that lenders’ beliefs are correct. Playing it safe
is optimal for all θ > k∗(φ) (since ∆(φ,θ|k∗, b x = 0) > 0 for all θ > k∗(φ)), and taking risks is
optimal for all θ < k∗(φ) (since ∆(φ,θ|k∗, b x = 1) < 0 for all θ < k∗(φ)).
We know that in this setup, an arbitrarily small increase in the proposed risk-taking cutoff
k∗(φ) generates an arbitrarily small increase in the interest rate. If interest rates do not change
suddenly (which is guaranteed by the sufﬁcient condition in Proposition 1, basically that fun-
damentals distribution has a variance large enough), then they cannot overcome the discrete
jump generated by the effects of changes in reputation that result from sudden changes in
beliefs from b x = 1 to b x = 0. Hence, we can ﬁnd equilibrium cutoffs arbitrarily close to each
other and, hence, a continuum of equilibria cutoffs. As we move the proposed cutoffs to the
right of k∗(φ), interest rates increase, reducing ∆(φ,θ|b k) for all θ until θ
∗
(φ) is reached. The
same is true as we move in the opposite direction, decreasing the proposed cutoffs from k∗
toward θ∗(φ). These extremes are the bounds to equilibrium cutoffs.
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In words, for a fundamental to be a cutoff in equilibrium, it should be the case that two
equilibria coexist at exactly that cutoff. At the one extreme, if lenders believe that all strategic
ﬁrms play it safe, then ﬁrms do that. Firms know that in this case their continuation and loan
repayment will be attributed at least partly to their good behavior, thereby improving their
reputation. At the other extreme, if lenders believe that all ﬁrms take risks, then strategic
ﬁrms do that. Under these beliefs, ﬁrms know that their continuation and repayment will be
attributedsolelytogoodluckandwon’timprovetheirreputationatall. Sincethedifferenceof
payoffs between these two extremes is strictly positive, there is a continuum of fundamentals
that fulﬁll this condition.
13In the ﬁnite-horizon game, where continuation values are endogenous, it is straightforward to
see that the range of multiple equilibria cutoffs in each period widens. Since multiplicity ex-
istsineverysingleperiod, multiplestreamsoffutureexpectedcontinuationvalues(consistent
with multiple equilibria in future periods) can be used to construct ∆t(φ,θ). By introducing
extreme streams of continuation values determined by the highest (Υ
0) and the lowest (Υ0)
probability of risk-taking in all future periods for all reputation levels, we can construct ex-
treme bounds θ∗(φ|Υ




(φ|Υ0) such that the region of multiplicity
in a given period is wider when considering the multiplicity of equilibria in future periods.
The multiplicity I have described here thwarts attempts to draw conclusions about the effec-
tiveness of reputation to reduce risk-taking. The higher the equilibrium cutoff is, the more
likely ﬁrms are to take risks and the higher interest rates are. Hence, to perform compara-
tive statics and comparative dynamics is impossible, since there is no explicit theory to guide
the selection of equilibrium, leaving a big role to self-fulﬁlling beliefs and payoff irrelevant
sunspots. However, here, as in Morris and Shin (2001), what really creates the multiplicity
is the assumption of complete information of fundamentals, which at the same time requires
an implausible degree of coordination and prediction of rivals’ behavior in equilibrium. This
orients us toward what to do next to move toward the selection of a unique equilibrium.
2.2 A Unique Equilibrium with Incomplete Information
What I do is modify the assumption that information about fundamentals is complete. I
assume instead that ﬁrms observe a noisy signal about the aggregate fundamental before
deciding which technology to use (safe or risky). After production occurs, fundamentals are
perfectly observed by both ﬁrms and lenders.13 The early signal observed by each ﬁrm is not
observed by lenders, who can infer it only after observing the true fundamental. Introducing
this noise into the observation of fundamentals is what leads to the selection of a unique
equilibrium. As I did before, ﬁrst I show uniqueness in a single period and then I expand the
solution into the ﬁnitely repeated game.
2.2.1 Uniqueness in a Single Period
Incomplete information about fundamentals allows us to select a unique equilibrium in a sin-
gle period, assuming exogenous future expected continuation values. The new assumptions
about the information structure are as follows:
13The assumption about the timing is important. If interest rates reveal, through the market’s aggregation of
information, the true fundamental before production occurs, we go back to complete information and a unique
equilibrium cannot be pinned down by introducing heterogeneity through signals. See Atkeson (2001).
14Assumption 4 Each ﬁrm i observes a signal about the economic fundamentals zi = θ + σi, where
i ∼ F (density f and mean 0) is identically and independently distributed across i. The precision of
the signal is measured by the inverse of the positive parameter σ.
Hence, conditional on θ, the distribution of signals z is determined by F(z−θ
σ ).
Assumption 5 (Monotone likelihood ratio property). For a > b,
f(a−θ)
f(b−θ) is increasing in θ.
Assumption (5) means that a ﬁrm which receives a signal of the occurrence of high funda-
mentals assigns a large probability that other strategic ﬁrms do too; hence, a large probability
that lenders believe strategic ﬁrms play it safe. Signals are thus useful not only to estimate θ
and cash ﬂows but also to make inferences about the beliefs that lenders will use to update
their views about the ﬁrm’s reputation.
Given this revised, incomplete information structure, the ﬁrm uses a cutoff strategy deﬁned
over the set of signals rather than over the set of fundamentals, which the ﬁrm not longer
observes. For a current signal, a strategy of a ﬁrm φ is a real number z∗(φ) such that the ﬁrm
uses safe technologies for zi > z∗(φ) and risky ones for zi < z∗(φ). In what follows, I eliminate
subscripts i for notational simplicity.
The next proposition states that under this incomplete information structure, when signals
are precise enough (σ → 0), there exists a unique Markovian perfect Bayesian equilibrium in
monotone cutoff strategies for each reputation level φ. The proof is in the Appendix.
Proposition 2 (Uniqueness in a Single Period)
Foragivenφ, asσ → 0, thereexistsinequilibriumauniquecutoffsignalz∗(φ)suchthat∆(φ,z|z∗(φ)) =
0 for z = z∗(φ), ∆(φ,z|z∗(φ)) > 0 for z > z∗(φ), and ∆(φ,z|z∗(φ)) < 0 for z < z∗(φ), where
∆(φ,z|z∗(φ)) are the expected differential gains to ﬁrms from playing it safe if a ﬁrm φ receives a




∆(φ,θ(b x), b x|z∗)db x = 0, (6)
where θ(b x) = z∗ − σF−1(b x)
Intuitively, relaxing the assumption of complete information about fundamentals and mak-
ing signals very precise, we can use the approach provided by global games to select a unique
equilibrium by iterated deletion of dominated strategies. Assume, for example, that a strate-
gic ﬁrm φ receives a signal θ∗(φ). The ﬁrm would like to play it safe only if lenders have a
15belief b x(φ) = 0. However, if fundamentals in fact happen to be θ∗(φ), lenders believe with
some positive probability that the ﬁrm observed a signal below θ∗(φ), in which case it would
have taken risks, no matter what. This means b x(φ) cannot be zero. But with b x(φ) > 0, the ﬁrm
would strictly prefer to take risks. Then θ∗(φ) cannot be an equilibrium cutoff anymore. By
continuity, the same reasoning can be applied to signals above θ∗(φ) and below θ
∗
(φ).
As is standard, I require σ → 0 so that the ﬁrm gives more weight to its private signal than
to the public signal given by the prior distribution of θ. In this case, the process of iterated
deletion of dominated strategies results in a unique cutoff z∗(φ) ∈ [θ∗(φ),θ
∗
(φ)], such that
the ﬁrm takes risks when z < z∗(φ) and plays it safe when z > z∗(φ). Hence, fundamentals
become also a coordination device. If a ﬁrm observes a low signal, it believes the fundamental
is low with high probability, which directly induces the ﬁrm to take risks. On top of that, the
ﬁrm also believes that other similar ﬁrms have observed a low signal and will take risks as
well. Since lenders will believe with a high probability that a single ﬁrm takes risks, there will
not be a reputation reward for playing it safe, which indirectly induces the ﬁrm to take risks.
This is why, fundamentals, through the generation of signals, coordinate ﬁrms’ expectations
about lenders’ beliefs and hence coordinate ﬁrms’ actions.
2.2.2 Uniqueness in a Finite Horizon Model
Now I switch from analyzing a single period to analyzing the full-ﬂedged ﬁnite horizon game
where future expected continuation values are endogenous. I show also uniqueness in this
full model, which is characterized by a unique sequence of equilibrium cutoffs as signals
become very precise. Also, as the last period goes to inﬁnity, there is a unique limit to the
sequence of perfect Markovian equilibrium for the ﬁnite game.
This extension is necessary because the previous sections were based on an assumed proﬁle
of well-deﬁned, positive, and monotonically increasing continuation values. Here I conﬁrm
these three properties arise in the dynamic equilibrium.
The following Proposition states that, based on the boundary condition VT+1(φ) = 0 for all φ,
expected continuation values Vt(φ) are well-deﬁned in each period t for all reputation levels
φ and then, a unique equilibrium exists in the ﬁnite horizon game as σ → 0. In order to solve
this ﬁnite dynamic global game, I follow the literature from Morris and Shin (2003), Toxvaerd
(2007), Giannitsarou and Toxvaerd (2007), and Steiner (2008).
Proposition 3 (Uniqueness in a Finite Horizon Game)
For each reputation φ, in each period t, as σ → 0, a unique cutoff signal z∗
t(φ) exists such that the
expected differential gains from playing it safe ∆t(φ,zt|z∗
t(φ)) = 0 for zt = z∗
t(φ), ∆t(φ,zt|z∗
t(φ)) >
160 for zt > z∗
t(φ), and ∆t(φ,zt|z∗




in Proposition 2) depend on Vt+1(φ) and Vt+1(φ0). Continuation values Vt(φ) are well-deﬁned and,










ps[Πs(θ) − Rt(φ) + βVt+1(φ0)]v(θ)dθ




(under the condition in Proposition 1) since ∆T(φ,zT|b zT(φ)) is well-deﬁned and VT+1(φ) = 0
for all φ; thus here reputation concerns do not generate multiplicity. Once z∗
T(φ) is deter-







(1 − φ)pr + φ[prV(z∗
T(φ)) + ps(1 − V(z∗
T(φ)))]
Then we can deﬁne expected continuation values in T for each reputation level φ. For signals
zT < z∗
T(φ), ﬁrms take risks and for signals zT > z∗
T(φ), ﬁrms play it safe. As σ → 0, expected









ps[Πs(θ) − RT(φ)]v(θ)dθ. (8)
Since equilibrium thresholds are well-deﬁned and unique in period T, continuation values
VT(φ) are also well-deﬁned and unique for all φ.
Now consider the decision of a ﬁrm φ in the next to last period T − 1. The problem is es-
sentially static, since continuation values VT(φ) are well-deﬁned and unique for all φ. Then,
∆T(φ,zT−1|b zT−1(φ)) is also well-deﬁned for all φ, thus leading to a unique equilibrium cutoff
z∗
T−1(φ) (following Proposition 2) and unique and well-deﬁned VT−1(φ) for all φ.
By straightforward inductive reasoning, we know that, as σ → 0, a unique sequence of cutoffs
{z∗
t(φ)}T
t=0 and a unique sequence of expected continuation values exist for each reputation
level φ in each period t, characterized by equation (7). Q.E.D.
The next proposition establishes that under certain conditions, in particular when the vari-
ance of the fundamentals distribution is large enough, there is a unique limit to the sequence
of perfect Markovian equilibria for the ﬁnite game.
17Proposition 4 If VT(φ) → V(φ) as T → ∞ and σ → 0, then a cutoff z∗(φ) exists for each φ that
is a unique limit to the sequence of cutoffs {z∗
t(φ)}T
t=0 of the ﬁnite-horizon Markov perfect equilibria
described in Proposition 3.
Proof In the Appendix, I show that the sufﬁcient condition for VT(φ) → V(φ) for all φ as









R(ps−pr)2 for all θ ∈ R. Having shown uniqueness for an
arbitrary ﬁnite-horizon T, I must show that the same reasoning is extended as T → ∞. First,
note that the value of taking safe and risky actions is a bounded and well-behaved monotone
function of T when continuation values converge to a ﬁxed point V(φ) as T → ∞. Second,
as deﬁned in equation (4), ∆t(φ,zt|z∗
t(φ)) also converges to a unique limit as T → ∞. Then
z∗
t(φ|T) → z∗
t(φ|∞) = z∗(φ) as T → ∞, where z∗
t(φ|T) is the equilibrium cutoff in a game
truncated in T and z∗(φ) is the equilibrium cutoff in any t in an inﬁnite-horizon game. Q.E.D.
Intuitively, we know that if we solve backward from someT by using as a boundary condition
the ﬁxed point VT+1(φ) = V(φ), rather than VT+1(φ) = 0, then we obtain a unique z∗(φ) for
each φ in all periods t < T. This matters because, as σ → 0, in a period t far enough from the
last period T → ∞, unique cutoffs and ex ante probabilities of risk-taking are constant over
time for each reputation level φ.
3 Establishing Negative Effects of Reputation Concerns
Now I use the unique equilibrium from the last propositions to show how in this model con-
cerns about reputation have potential negative effects as well as the positive effects already
understood. Reputation concerns reduce risk-taking, but they are fragile. Small and not obvi-
ous changes in economic fundamentals can suddenly break down the discipline induced by
those concerns. Furthermore, when they are gone, they are gone for a bunch of different ﬁrms
with intermediate and good reputation, generating a clustering of risk-taking that can have
far-reaching aggregate negative consequences. I demonstrate these results ﬁrst in a formal
abstract analysis and then in an illustrative numerical simulation of the model.
3.1 The Formal Analysis
A formal dynamic analysis of reputation concerns in credit markets establishes both the pos-
itive and potential negative effects of reputation at an aggregate level.
183.1.1 The Standard Positive Effects
The next proposition shows why ﬁrms are concerned about constructing and maintaining
good reputations. A better reputation for a ﬁrm implies a lower ex ante probability of taking
risks, and hence that it pays lower interest rates and has a higher continuation value. The
proof is in the Appendix.
Proposition 5 (Reputation, Risk-Taking, Lending Rates and Continuation Values)
As a ﬁrm’s reputation φ improves
i) Its ex ante probability of risk-taking monotonically decreases (that is,
dV(z∗(φ))
dφ < 0 for all φ ∈ [0,1]).
ii) The interest rate it faces monotonically decreases (that is,
dR(φ)
dφ < 0 for all φ ∈ [0,1]).
iii) Its continuation value monotonically increases (that is,
dV(φ)
dφ > 0 for all φ ∈ [0,1]).
The next Proposition shows the positive effect of reputation concerns in reducing risk-taking
by ﬁrms of all kinds of reputation, when compared to an artiﬁcial situation in which ﬁrms are
not concerned about their reputation, simply because the reputation cannot change.14
Proposition 6 (Reputation Concerns Reduce Risk-Taking)
Deﬁne as e z∗(φ) the risk-taking cutoffs when reputation is not a concern (this is, when reputation
cannot change). Reputation concerns reduce the ex-ante probability of risk-taking (that is, z∗(φ) <
e z∗(φ)) for all φ ∈ (0,1) and does not change it (this is z∗(φ) = e z∗(φ)) for φ = {0,1}.
Proof With reputation concerns, z∗(φ) is determined by equation (6) in the following way:
Z 1
0
∆(φ, b x|z∗)db x = 0.
Without reputation concerns, e z∗(φ) is determined just by
∆(φ, b x = 1|e z∗) = 0,
since the restriction that reputation cannot change is exactly the same as assuming b x = 1. Fix-
ing V(φ) and R(φ) for all φ, from equation (4) we know ∆(φ,z∗|z∗, b x) achieves the minimum
at b x = 1. Hence, applying lemma 1, e z∗(φ) is not lower than z∗(φ). Since R(φ|z∗) ≤ R(φ|e z∗)
and V(φ|z∗) ≥ V(φ|e z∗) for all φ, ∆(φ, b x|z∗) ≥ ∆(φ, b x|e z∗) for all φ and all b x, which rein-
forces the previous argument. Hence, from equation (2), z∗(φ) < e z∗(φ) for all φ ∈ (0,1)
and z∗(φ) = e z∗(φ) for φ = {0,1} . Q.E.D.
14For example, credit histories are erased or lenders cannot observe the age of the ﬁrm.
193.1.2 The New Potential Negative Effects
Now I can go further and establish that the existence of reputation concerns may also have
negative effects by creating sudden changes in aggregate risk-taking behavior without obvi-
ous changes in fundamentals. First, we can characterize ﬁrms’ equilibrium cutoffs z∗(φ) for
different reputation levels φ. The next lemma shows that the concerns for reputation forma-
tion convexify the schedule of cutoffs. The proof is in the Appendix.





φ ∈ [0,1], where e z∗(φ) are the cutoffs without reputation concerns). Furthermore, there are always
signals of the ﬁrm’s type precise enough (
ps
pr high enough) such that the schedule of cutoffs is convex
(that is,
d2z∗(φ)
dφ2 > 0) for all φ.
I use Figure 3 to explain the intuition for Lemma 3. Each ﬁrm can be represented by a point
on the graph, a combination of levels of reputation φ and an observed signal z. Firms follow a
cutoff schedule. A ﬁrm φ that observes a signal below z∗(φ) will decide to take risks and will
play it safe otherwise. Assume, for example, that without reputation concerns, the schedule
of cutoffs (e z∗(φ)) is linear in φ (as in the ﬁgure). As we know from Proposition 6, reputation
concerns reduce risk-taking (that is, reduce cutoffs from e z∗(φ) to z∗(φ)) for all φ. However,
the strength of this force is not the same across reputation levels. I start by discussing φ = 0
and then gradually raise φ.
Firms with reputation φ = 0 cannot change their reputation, which means that the cutoff
for risky behavior is the same, with and without reputation concerns (z∗(0) = e z∗(0)). As φ
increases, ﬁrms have higher reputation concerns, which rapidly reduces cutoffs. This effect
achieves the maximum at φM, where reputation can increase the most. After this point, fur-
ther increments in φ reduce the role of reputation concerns. At the extreme φ = 1, reputation
cannot improve further, so the cutoff is again the same with and without reputation concerns
(z∗(1) = e z∗(1)). For ﬁrms with poor reputation the two types of reputation incentives - con-
tinuation and reputation - reinforce each other in reducing risk-taking. For ﬁrms with better
reputation, while continuation effects increase with φ, reputation effects decrease.
Now I can summarize results considering just three types of ﬁrms, based on their reputation.
Poor reputation ﬁrms are prone to take risks because their gains from surviving are low (they
will have to pay high interest rates in the future) and they cannot change their reputation
much. Intermediate reputation ﬁrms want to take safe actions not because they can lose a
lot if they die, but because they can improve their reputation a lot if they survive. Good
reputationﬁrms wanttotakesafe actionsforthe reversereason, not becausetheycan improve
their reputation a lot if they survive but because they can lose a lot if they die.
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This leads us to a ﬁnal, crucial proposition:
Proposition 7 (Fragilityofreputationandclusteringofrisk-taking)
i) Reputation is fragile at a ﬁrm level. For highly precise signals about fundamentals (σ → 0), small
changes in fundamentals θ around the optimal cutoff z∗(φ) induce a change in risk-taking, clustered
among ﬁrms with reputation level φ.
ii) Reputation is fragile at an aggregate level. For strong reputation concerns (
ps
pr high enough), small
changes in fundamentals θ around the optimal cutoff z∗(φM) for intermediate reputation ﬁrms induce
a change in risk-taking, clustered among ﬁrms with intermediate and good reputation levels.
The ﬁrst part of this proposition is just a result from global games. If θ < z∗(φ), then when the
signalnoisegoestozero, almostallﬁrmswithreputationlevelφreceiveasignalz < z∗(φ)and
decide to take risks. Hence, reputation concerns are fragile in the sense that small changes in
fundamentals around z∗(φ) induce sudden changes in risk-taking for ﬁrms with reputation
φ. Our equilibrium selection creates a clustering of risk-taking among ﬁrms with the same
reputation level.
The second part of Proposition 7 is a corollary of Lemma 3 for a given distribution of repu-
tation levels. When fundamentals are strong enough (high θ), small variations do not induce
ﬁrms of different kind of reputation to modify their risk-taking behavior. Contrarily, when
fundamentals are weak enough (low θ), then small variations may induce ﬁrms of different
kind of reputation to modify their risk-taking behavior. Changes around weak fundamentals
generate clustering of risk-taking among ﬁrms with different reputation levels. This fragility
21is generated at an aggregate level by learning primitives. Figure 4 illustrates fragility both at
a ﬁrm and at an aggregate level.
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While reputation concerns have a positive effect (reducing excessive risk-taking) they also
have a negative effect. Because they are fragile, their breakdown can lead to sudden and iso-
lated clusters of risk-taking, big increases in default probabilities, and huge losses for lenders.
Before illustrating reputation fragility by a simulation exercise (which also shows how to
solve the model numerically), let me highlight the fact that clustering depends not only on
the convex schedule of cutoffs, but also on the reputation distribution in the economy. In par-
ticular, a distribution with a large mass of intermediate and good reputation ﬁrms strengthens
the results.15 In the numerical exercise below, I derive numerically the endogenous station-
ary distribution of ﬁrms, reputations and show it is indeed skewed toward intermediate and
good reputation levels, where cutoffs are more alike. This reinforces the aggregate effects of
clustering among ﬁrms with intermediate and good reputation.
3.2 A Numerical Exercise
Here I use a numerical example to illustrate the results just established in the formal analysis
above, how a breakdown of reputation concerns may generate large changes in aggregate
behavior in response to small changes in aggregate fundamentals.
15To derive theoretically the endogenous reputation distribution is beyond my scope here, however the exten-
sion is feasible and interesting. Since cutoffs z
∗(φ) are independent of the distribution, the reputation distribution
depends primarily on assumptions about the birth and reputation priors of new ﬁrms, which can be pinned down
assuming entry of ﬁrms at a given cost
223.2.1 The Exercise
For this exercise I must assign the model’s parameters some reasonable values. In particular
I require these values to fulﬁll four conditions.
• Risk-taking is almost never efﬁcient.16 It happens for fundamentals that occur ex ante
with a probability of only 0.001%.
• Short-term cash ﬂows for any level of fundamental are higher than interest rates in
equilibrium, hence, ﬁrms can always pay back debts if they continue.
• Without reputation concerns, interest rates are not convex in φ, so I can show the forces
of reputation concerns in convexifying them.
• Conditions for uniqueness of bounds (from Proposition 1) and convergence of continu-
ation values to a ﬁxed point (from Proposition 4) are fulﬁlled.
I assume that proﬁts from safe actions (Πs) are constant and proﬁts from risky actions (Πr)
decrease with fundamentals. Hence, as in the model, risky actions are more tempting for low
values of θ. In particular Πr = Πs+K−ψθ with ψ > 0, where Πs = 1.5, K = 0.4, and ψ = 0.2.
I also assume that the probability of continuation is ps = 0.9 when playing it safe and pr = 0.7
when taking risks. Finally, I assume the discount factor is β = 0.95, the risk-free interest rate
is R = 1 and fundamentals are distributed as a standard normal (this is, θ ∼ N(0,1)).
For thisexercise, Ialso addto thebasic modela setof signalscorrelated toactions, that lenders
observe after the ﬁrm continues. One reason is that it shows the ﬂexibility of the model to
include additional signals such that they allow lenders to make better inferences about the
ﬁrm’s type. Another reason is that, in the basic setup of my model, ﬁrm reputation only
increases with age since the only potential positive signal is continuation. These additional
signals increase the importance of reputation formation. Naturally, I assume the probability
of generating a good signal after a ﬁrm continues is greater if playing it safe (αs > αr). For
this exercise in particular I assume αs = 0.8 and αr = 0.4.
Using these parameters I compare the results of the basic model (with reputation concerns)
with an artiﬁcial situation in which the ﬁrm’s reputation cannot change (without reputation
concerns), and identify the positive and negative effects of reputation concerns, as described
in the formal analysis.
I proceed in two steps. First I compute the limit of the schedule of cutoffs for different rep-
utation levels as T → ∞, with and without reputation concerns. These cutoffs are the same
16Risk-taking is efﬁcient when ﬁrms decide to take risks if lenders observe their actions and charge a corre-
sponding high interest rate.
23in every period of the model. Then I simulate realizations of fundamentals for 100 periods
and I aggregate the risk-taking behavior of ﬁrms that follow those cutoffs. The computational
procedure is described in the Appendix.
3.2.2 Positive Effects
Figure 5 shows, for each reputation φ, cutoffs with and without reputation concerns (z∗(φ)
and e z∗(φ), respectively) and ex ante probabilities of risk-taking (V(z∗(φ)) and V(e z∗(φ))) that
apply to any period when T → ∞. As stated in Proposition 5, the probability of risk-taking
decreases with reputation. Furthermore, as stated in Proposition 6, for all reputation levels,
the probability that ﬁrms take risks is lower with reputation concerns than without them. For
example, the ex ante probability that a ﬁrm with a reputation level φ = 0.4 takes risks is only
4% with reputation concerns but 50% without them. Recall that, by construction, risk-taking
is almost never efﬁcient (it is only efﬁcient for θ < −4, which happens with a probability of
only 0.001%). Hence, the gap between the two curves in the second plot of Figure 5 shows
how reputation concerns reduce ex ante probabilities of inefﬁcient risk-taking.
Figure 5: Reputation Concerns Reduce the Ex Ante Probability of Risk-Taking
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Figure 6 shows the expected continuation values and lending rates for different reputation
levels φ. Also as stated in Proposition 5, continuation values increase and lending rates de-
crease with reputation. Furthermore, ﬁrms have higher expected continuation values and pay
lower interest rates when having reputation concerns.
3.2.3 Negative Effects
Here I simulate fundamental shocks realization for 100 periods and aggregate the risk-taking
behavior in the economy. In this way I can show how the fragility of reputation concerns can
24Figure 6: Reputation Concerns Increase Continuation Values and Reduce Lending Rates
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create sudden and isolated events of clustering of risk-taking, with spikes in aggregate loan
defaults and lenders’ losses, without obvious changes in aggregate fundamentals.
Three characteristics of this simulation exercise are worthwhile to note. First, I’m aggregating
only strategic ﬁrms, since these are the ones whose behavior changes with fundamentals. If
all of them play safe, the aggregate probability of loan default is 10% (since ps = 0.9). If all
of them take risks, the aggregate probability of loan default is 30% (since pr = 0.7). Second, I
aggregateoverﬁrmsassuminganinvariantuniformreputationdistributioninallperiodsﬁrst
and an evolving reputation distribution later. Finally, I choose 100 periods where risk-taking
is never efﬁcient (that is, no fundamental realization is below −4).
The ﬁrst plot of Figure 7 shows aggregate loan default probabilities in the 100 periods for a
ﬁxed uniform reputation distribution. Without reputation concerns, aggregate default closely
followschangesinfundamentals. Withreputationconcerns, aggregatedefaultislesssensitive
to those changes in fundamentals. It is low in general and spikes when conditions weaken
enough. This comparison reveals that reputation concerns in general reduce inefﬁcient risk-
taking (a positive aggregate effect) but also creates large spikes in default rates without ob-
vious changes in fundamentals (a negative aggregate effect). The main reason can be seen in
Figure 5. Reputation effects are stronger for intermediate reputation levels than for extreme
ones, convexifying the schedule of cutoffs and generating clustering of risk taking among a
bunch of ﬁrms with intermediate and good reputations, when fundamentals go below values
around −2.
In the second plot of Figure 7, I allow the reputation distribution to evolve over time, starting
from a uniform distribution in the initial period. I assume that new ﬁrms enter to replace dead
ones with a reputation prior φ = 0.5. As I show later, this distribution evolves biasing towards
good reputations. Recognizing this bias reinforces not only the positive effects of reputation
25concerns (less inefﬁcient aggregate default at most periods), but also the negative ones, since
spikes in default rates are even more isolated and sensible to small changes in fundamentals.
This is mainly because the market is mostly composed by ﬁrms with intermediate and good
reputations, which are the ones that cluster when fundamentals weaken enough.
Figure 7: Simulated Default Probability with Fixed and Evolving Reputation Distribution
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Figure 8 shows the stationary expected distribution of reputation in the market and the evo-
lution of ﬁrms with reputation 0.01, 0.99 and the assigned prior 0.5, as a fraction of the total
of ﬁrms. The fraction of ﬁrms with poor reputation tends to disappear while the fraction of
ﬁrms with good reputation grows over time toward a stationary distribution. However, this
evolution is not monotonic. When a spike of risk-taking occurs, good ﬁrms die at a higher
rate than in normal times, and are replaced by new ﬁrms with an intermediate reputation of
φ = 0.5. Hence, in those periods of high risk-taking, there is a decline in the average quality
of ﬁrms in the market. This is relevant because a bad enough shock in fundamentals does not
only magnify crisis, but also makes it persistent.
Finally, Figure 9 shows the model’s view of aggregate net returns to lenders.17 When fun-
damentals weaken enough, we see that returns decline catastrophically, since most ﬁrms,
regardless of their reputations, take risks. Since lenders charge low rates to good reputa-
tion ﬁrms, sudden losses are large. With reputation concerns, lending rates are lower, hence
lenders losses are greater when they rarely occur. This matters because reputation concerns
reduce the frequency of crises, but they magnify lenders’ losses when crises do occur.
This exercise has illustrated that reputation concerns have negative as well as positive effects.
17First I obtained individual net returns for each reputation level (computed by the lending rate charged to φ
multiplied by the true probability of no default minus the risk-free rate). Then I calculated the weighted sum of
individual returns to obtain aggregate net returns.
26Figure 8: Stationary Reputation Distribution and Initial Evolution of Certain Reputations
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Reputation concerns deter excessive risk-taking in general, but also generate sudden clus-
ters of risk-taking behavior, characterized by more default and large losses to lenders, even
without noticeable changes in fundamentals. Even when the exercise is based on arbitrary
parameters, results are highly robust to variations in them, as long as reputation concerns
remain important and conditions for uniqueness and convergence are guaranteed.
4 Summary and Implications
Firms’ concerns about their reputation reduce excessive risk-taking. This positive effect of
reputation is widely accepted on both formal and informal grounds. Here I have studied
the effects of reputation concerns from an aggregate perspective, when incentives to take risk
vary with the state of the economy. My main ﬁnding is that reputation concerns may have
negative as well as positive aggregate effects. These concerns are in fact fragile, and may
suddenly disappear, leading to large changes in aggregate risk-taking as well-known and
reputable ﬁrms cluster in response to small or not obvious changes in fundamentals.
In my model, reputations can eventually be constructed, destroyed, and managed. How-
ever, this desirable feature comes with a cost in terms of equilibria multiplicity. To overcome
this problem I have interpreted the reputation model extended with fundamentals as a non-
standarddynamicglobalgameinwhichstrategiccomplementaritiesariseendogenouslyfrom
reputation formation. This allows me to select a unique equilibrium, robust to perturbations
in information about fundamentals, which become a coordination device for risk-taking.
Two clear testable implications from the model have been supported empirically. One is that,
if risk-taking is more tempting during recessions, then reputation should evolve less and with
27Figure 9: Simulated Aggregate Net Returns to Lenders
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moredifﬁcultyinbadtimesthaningoodtimes.18 Theothersupportedimplicationisthatrisk-
taking and defaults cluster in time, especially around recessions, to a large degree that cannot
be explained just from a weakening in fundamentals.19
The model’s results also have several new policy implications, all of which may tell us some-
thing about the recent ﬁnancial crisis. One implication is that reputation can be thought as a
self-disciplining screening device provided by the market, which makes unnecessary and in-
efﬁcient a regulatory intervention to deter excessive risk-taking under certain fundamentals.
However, I argue that this device is fragile and may suddenly disappear, eventually making
regulation necessary to prevent crises. This suggests that, to be efﬁcient, regulation should
be cyclical, operating only when economic fundamentals move toward regions in which risk-
taking becomes more tempting. For the recent crisis this suggests, for example, that when
the housing bubble was growing, the intervention of a regulatory body, responsible for over-
seeing mortgage paperwork, controlling loan risks, and restricting debt ratios of ﬁnancial
institutions might have helped prevent the subsequent crisis.
Another implication is that, during periods of clustering of risk-taking, credit ratings are
likely to be uninformative about default probabilities. In certain times, ﬁrms with AAA bond
ratings may have incentives to undertake risky projects, exactly like ﬁrms with not-so-good
ratings. In these periods, reputation loses its meaning. This argues against the use of Basel
II regulations, which rely on ratings to determine the level of capital that banks should hold.
18This is supported empirically by Nickell, Perraudin, and Varotto (2000), Bangia et al. (2002), Altman and
Rijken A. (2006), and Ordonez (2008) using data on corporate credit-rating transitions over the business cycle.
This pattern has been also observed during the latest ﬁnancial crisis. The Moody’s Credit Policy report of July
2008 shows that the rating volatility decreased signiﬁcantly, almost 50% with respect to historical averages.
19See the work of Campbell et al. (2001) and Das et al. (2007).
28Since ratings may lose information content exactly when they are most needed, they may in
fact spread a loss of conﬁdence throughout the ﬁnancial system. In fact, part of the failure
that led to the wider crisis has been assigned to a breakdown in the bond rating system (The
Economist, August 16, 2007).
Finally, a third implication is that policies which promote credit bureaus can be double-edged.
They do improve learning and increase reputation incentives in domestic ﬁnancial systems,
so they may be effective in reducing excessive risk-taking. However, they may also have the
potential to exacerbate credit crises.
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30A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
First we will prove two lemmas that describe single crossing properties and allow us to iden-
tify a unique cutoff in the set of fundamentals (θ) and in the set of beliefs (b x) when ﬁxing an
interest rate (this is, a ﬁxed b k).
Lemma 4 (Fundamental single crossing) For every reputation level φ ∈ (0,1) and cutoff belief b k, ﬁx
a b x ∈ [0,1] for all θ. There exists a unique θ∗ ∈ [θ(φ|b k),θ(φ|b k)] such that ∆(φ,θ|b k, b x) < 0 for θ < θ∗,
∆(φ,θ|b k, b x) = 0 for θ = θ∗, and ∆(φ,θ|b k, b x) > 0 for θ > θ∗. For φ = {0,1}, θ∗ = θ(φ|b k) = θ(φ|b k)
for any b x. Furthermore, θ∗ is non-decreasing in b k and b x.
Proof By Lemma 1 ∆(φ,θ|b k) is monotonically increasing in θ, hence there is a unique θ∗ such
that ∆(φ,θ∗|b k, b x) = 0. By assumption 3, and since b x ∈ [0,1], θ∗ ∈ [θ(φ|b k),θ(φ|b k)]. Also by
Lemma 1, ∆(φ,θ|b k) is non-increasing in b k and b x, then θ∗ is non-decreasing in b k and b x. If
beliefs of risk-taking increase, the ﬁrm will weakly prefer to play risky at the previous θ∗,
requiring θ increasing to recover the indifference. Q.E.D.
Lemma 5 (Belief single crossing) For every reputation level φ ∈ (0,1) and cutoff belief b k, ﬁx a
θ ∈ [θ(φ|b k),θ(φ|b k)]. There exists a unique b x∗ ∈ [0,1] such that ∆(φ,θ|b k, b x) > 0 for b x < b x∗,
∆(φ,θ|b k, b x) = 0 for b x = b x∗ and ∆(φ,θ|b k, b x) < 0 for b x > b x∗. For φ = {0,1}, any b x ∈ [0,1] delivers
∆(φ,θ|b k, b x) = 0. Furthermore, b x∗ is increasing in θ.
Proof By Lemma 1 ∆(φ,θ|b k) is monotonically decreasing in b x when φ ∈ (0,1), hence there is
a unique b x∗ ∈ [0,1] such that ∆(φ,θ|b k, b x∗) = 0. Also by Lemma 1, ∆(φ,θ|b k) is increasing in θ,
and so is b x∗. If fundamentals improve, the ﬁrm will strictly prefer to play safe at b x∗, requiring
an increase in the beliefs that the ﬁrm will play risky (b x) to recover the indifference. Finally,
for the special cases of φ = 0 and φ = 1, from equation (2) and assumption 3, θ(φ|b k) = θ(φ|b k)
and by deﬁnition any b x ∈ [0,1] supports indifference. Q.E.D.
The ﬁrst part of the Proposition follows directly from Lemmas 4 and 5. A cutoff k∗(φ) is an
equilibrium strategy only if it is a best response for any realization of the fundamental θ. Take
a cutoff k∗(φ) such that k∗(φ) ∈ (θ(φ|k∗),θ(φ|k∗)). Such a k∗(φ) is guaranteed by Lemmas
2 and 4. Furthermore we know that x(φ,θ) = 0 for all θ > k∗(φ) and x(φ,θ) = 1 for all
θ < k∗(φ). From Lemma 5, at θ = k∗(φ), indifference occurs at some 0 < x∗(φ,k∗) < 1.
The cutoff k∗(φ) is an equilibrium because, for all θ > k∗(φ), ∆(φ,θ|k∗) > 0, and hence it is
optimal for the ﬁrm to play safe (i.e., x(φ,θ) = 0). Similarly, for all θ < k∗(φ), ∆(φ,θ|k∗) < 0,
and hence it is optimal for the ﬁrm to take risks (i.e., x(φ,θ) = 1).
Finally, sincetheconditionsforequilibriumareboth∆(φ,k∗|k∗, b x = 0) > 0and∆(φ,k∗|k∗, b x =
1) < 0 and since ∆(φ,θ|b k) is monotonically not increasing in b k (from lemma 1), an arbitrarily
close fundamental k∗ + ε (with ε → 0) is also an equilibrium cutoff.
31The bounds of the equilibrium cutoffs [θ∗(φ),θ
∗
(φ)] are determined in the following way:
θ∗(φ) is the indifference fundamental when beliefs are b k = θ∗ and b x = 0. This is the lowest
fundamental that can be sustained in equilibrium fully considering reputation gains and the
lowest possible interest rate R(φ|θ∗). Lemmas 2 and 4 guarantee this bound exists and is
ﬁnite. Similarly, θ
∗
(φ) is determined by the fundamental that solves ∆(φ,θ|θ
∗
, b x = 1) = 0.
To show the sufﬁcient condition under which these bounds are unique for each φ, ﬁx a b x for
all θ and ﬁx a belief b k (i.e, a given R(φ|b k)). Then k∗ solves psΠs(k∗) − prΠr(k∗) + β(ps −









∂b k = (ps−pr)
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∂b k . Therewillbeauniquebestresponseto
b k when ∂k∗










R(ps − pr)2φv(b k)
Pr(c|φ,b k)2 . (9)
The worst situation to fulﬁll the condition happens when φ = 1 and Pr(c|φ,b k) = pr. Since











R(ps − pr)2 , for all θ ∈ R. (10)
This condition basically requires a variance of fundamentals large enough such that interest
rates do not jump suddenly with changes in beliefs. For example, if fundamentals are nor-
mally distributed, θ ∼ N(µ,γ2), v(θ) ≤ 1
γ
√
2π for all θ and the sufﬁcient condition can be








∂θ ] for all θ.
For φ = 1, and from Lemmas 2 and 5, k∗(1) = θ∗(1) = θ
∗
(1), since ∆(φ,θ|b k, b x = 0) =
∆(φ,θ|b k, b x = 1) for all b k (i.e., b x does not play a role in generating multiplicity). Under the
condition in equation (10), k∗(1) is unique. Using the same logic, k∗(0) is always a unique
equilibrium for φ = 0. To see this, just replace φ = 0 in equation (9).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof To prove this proposition, I proceed in four steps. First, I derive the posterior density
and distribution of θ given a signal z. Second, I prove there is a unique signal z∗(φ) that makes
a strategic ﬁrm φ indifferent in expectation between taking risk or not. Third, I show that, for
any σ, using z∗(φ) is a best response when the prior about θ follows a uniform distribution on
the real line and lenders believe z∗(φ) is the equilibrium cutoff. Finally, I show that, as σ → 0,
the best response in a game with any prior distribution of θ uniformly converges to following
the unique cutoff z∗(φ) when lenders believe z∗(φ) is the equilibrium cutoff.
• Step 1: Distributions of fundamentals conditional on signals






















−∞ v(z − σu)f(u)du
. (12)





where fz and fz|θ are the densities of z and z|θ, respectively. Since z is the sum of θ and
σ, its density is given by the convolution of their densities, i.e., v and fσ. Considering that
Fσ(η) = F(η/σ), fσ(η) =
f(η/σ)










We can obtain the distribution of the observed signal z after observing a fundamental θ,















Plugging equations (15) and (14) in (13), we obtain equation (11). The posterior distribution












and the expression in equation (12) follows from variable transformation u = z−θ
σ . Q.E.D.
• Step 2: Unique equilibrium cutoff z∗(φ).
Lemma 7 There is a unique cutoff signal for each reputation φ such that ∆(φ,z|z∗) = 0 for z = z∗,
∆(φ,z|z∗) > 0 for z > z∗, and ∆(φ,z|z∗) < 0 for z < z∗, where ∆(φ,z|z∗) are the expected
differential gains from playing safe for a ﬁrm φ that observes z when lenders believe the cutoff is z∗.
This cutoff z∗ is obtained using Laplacian beliefs over the probability the ﬁrm plays risky when the








∆(φ,θ(b x), b x|z∗)db x = 0. (16)
33Proof When fundamentals θ are not observed directly, differential gains ∆ turn into expected
differential gains conditional on the signal. When the ﬁrm observes a signal z and lenders
believe ﬁrms use a cutoff b z, expected gains from playing safe are
∆(φ,z|b z) ≡ E[∆(φ,θ|b z)|z]. (17)
Introducing noise in the observation of fundamentals allows us to pin down the believed
probability of risk taking b x as a function of cutoff beliefs b z and observed fundamentals θ.
b x = F









∆(φ,θ, b x(θ)|b z)dFθ|z(θ|z).
Note that θ = b z − σF−1(b x). From equation (12), deﬁne
Ψ(b x|z,b z) = Fθ|z(b z − σF−1(b x)|z,b z) =
R ∞
z−b z
σ +F−1(b x) v(z − σu)f(u)du
R ∞
−∞ v(z − σu)f(u)du
.




∆(φ,θ(b x), b x|b z)dΨ(b x|z,b z).
Laplacian beliefs arise from
Ψ(b x|z,b z) = Pr(θ < b z − σF−1(b x)|z) = F[
z − b z
σ
+ F−1(b x)].




∆(φ,θ(b x), b x|z∗)db x = 0.
By Lemmas 4 and 5, we know there is a unique solution z∗(φ) to this equation. Q.E.D.
• Step 3: Best response with uniform priors over fundamentals
Now we need to verify that a ﬁrm φ playing risky if z < z∗(φ) and safe if z > z∗(φ) indeed
constitutes an equilibrium. Signals z allow ﬁrms to have an idea not only about the funda-
mental but also about the signal that lenders believe the ﬁrm has observed. Following Tox-
vaerd (2007), I ﬁrst assume θ is drawn from a uniform distribution on the real line, hence an
improper distribution with inﬁnite probability mass. This assumption allows us to normalize
the prior distribution assuming v(θ) = 1, simplifying the density to fθ|z(θ|z) = σ−1f(z−θ
σ )
and the distribution to Fθ|z(θ|z) = F(z−θ
σ ). We will denote e ∆(φ,z|b z) the expected differential
34gains from safe actions for the special case in which the prior of fundamentals is uniform,


















Changing variables introducing m = θ−b z
σ ,










We can rewrite it more conveniently, deﬁning b ∆










As shown in Athey (2002), because of the monotone likelihood property, b ∆(φ,z,z0|b z) inher-
its the single crossing property of ∆(φ,θ|b z). This means there exists a z∗(φ,b z,z0) such that
b ∆(φ,z,z0|b z) > 0 if z > z∗(φ,b z,z0) and b ∆(φ,z,z0|b z) < 0 if z < z∗(φ,b z,z0). Assuming z < z0 and
b ∆(φ,z,z|b z) = 0,
b ∆(φ,z0,z0|b z) ≥ b ∆(φ,z,z0|b z) ≥ b ∆(φ,z,z|b z) = 0, (strict > for φ ∈ (0,1)).
Theﬁrstinequalitycomesfrom thestatemonotonicityandthesecondfromthesingle crossing
property. A symmetric argument holds for z > z0. Hence, there exists a best response χ : R →
R such that
e ∆(φ,z|b z) > 0 if z > χ(b z)
e ∆(φ,z|b z) = 0 if z = χ(b z)
e ∆(φ,z|b z) < 0 if z < χ(b z)




e ∆(φ,θ(b x), b x|z∗)db x = 0. (19)
Hence, χ(z∗(φ)) = z∗(φ), showing that there is a unique equilibrium in cutoff strategies for
each φ such that
x∗(φ,z) =
(
0 if z > z∗(φ)
1 if z < z∗(φ)
. (20)
Q.E.D.
• Step 4: Best response with general priors over fundamentals
Lemma 8 ∆(φ,z|b z) → e ∆(φ,z|b z) uniformly, when b z = z − σξ, as σ → 0.
35Proof First, ∆(φ,z|z − σξ) → e ∆(φ,z|z − σξ) continuously as σ → 0, this is,
Ψ(b x|z,z − σξ) =
R ∞
ξ+F−1(b x) v(z − σu)f(u)du
R ∞
−∞ v(z − σu)f(u)du
→ 1 − F
 
ξ + F−1(b x)

≡ e Ψ(b x|z,z − σξ).
As in Toxvaerd (2007), we show convergence with respect to the uniform convergence norm,
which implies uniform convergence. Uniformity ensures that the equivalence between the
games with the two different assumptions about the prior distributions is not the result of a
discontinuity at σ = 0.
Pick z(φ) < θ∗(φ) and z(φ) > θ
∗
(φ) and restrict attention to the compact sets Z ≡ [z(φ),z(φ)]
and Zσ ≡ [z(φ) − σξ,z(φ) + σξ]. Hence, ∆(φ,z|b z) maps into a compact set.
Deﬁne the uniform convergence norm as
k ∆(φ) k≡ supz,b z{|∆(φ,z|b z)|}.
We can show continuity with respect to the Euclidean metric. Fix z0 and b z0 such that
∀1 > 0,∃δ1 |z − z0| < δ1 ⇒ |∆(φ,z|b z) − e ∆(φ,z0|b z)| < 1,∀b z
∀2 > 0,∃δ2 |b z − b z0| < δ2 ⇒ |∆(φ,z|b z) − e ∆(φ,z|b z0)| < 2,∀z
This implies
√





By the triangle inequality,
|∆(φ,z|b z) − ∆(φ,z0|b z0)| = |∆(φ,z|b z) − ∆(φ,z0|b z) + ∆(φ,z0|b z) − ∆(φ,z0|b z0)|
≤ |∆(φ,z|b z) − ∆(φ,z0|b z0)| + |∆(φ,z0|b z) − ∆(φ,z0|b z0)|
≤ 1 + 2.
Hence, ∆(φ,z|b z) belongs to the space of continuous functions on Z × b Z.
Uniform convergence is equivalent to
k ∆(φ) − e ∆(φ) k= supz,b z{∆(φ,z|b z) − e ∆(φ,z|b z)} → 0
with respect to the uniform convergence norm, as σ → 0, after substituting for the functions
and taking limits. Q.E.D.
A.3 Conditions for Proposition 4
In this section we discuss the conditions for Vt(φ) → V(φ) as T → ∞ (i.e., by backward
induction, continuation values converge to a ﬁxed point for all φ and periods t far enough
36from T). These ﬁxed points are the bounded limits required to show that there is an inﬁnite
horizon equilibrium that is a unique limit of the ﬁnite horizon Markov perfect equilibrium.20
In short, the condition for convergence is that the variance of fundamentals is large enough. I
will prove this by steps. First, I discuss the case without reputation formation as a benchmark
in which reputation levels do not interact and obtain sufﬁcient conditions for convergence.
Then, I introduce reputation formation and show that those conditions are also sufﬁcient.
Step 1: No reputation formation:
This is an artiﬁcial and expositional convenient case in which a ﬁrm is born with a given repu-
tation and cannot change it (because age cannot be observed, for example). First assume safe
actions deliver higher expected continuation values. That is, if commitment were feasible,
ﬁrms would choose to take safe actions rather than risky actions, regardless of their reputa-
tion. This assumption makes sense in our context, since the focus is on the case in which safe
actions are almost always the efﬁcient behavior.
From Proposition 3 and without reputation formation (i.e., Vt+1(φ0) = Vt+1(φ)),










Applying the envelope theorem,
∂Vt(φ)
∂Vt+1(φ)





[ps − V(z∗(φ))(ps − pr)].
The cutoff z∗ is determined by psΠs(z∗)−prΠr(z∗)−(ps −pr)R(φ|z∗) = −β(ps −pr)Vt+1(φ),
















Pr(c)2 v(z∗) > 0.
Recall
∂Vt(φ)
∂Vt+1(φ) > 0 and Vt(φ) > 0 when Vt+1(φ) = 0. Hence, convergence to a ﬁxed point
V(φ) happens if
∂Vt(φ)
∂Vt+1(φ) < 1. It is clear this is the case for φ = 0 (since
∂R(φ|z∗)
∂z∗ = 0). At
the other extreme, when φ = 1, imposing the worst combination of parameters to fulﬁll the
requirement (V(z∗(φ)) = 0 and Pr(c) = pr) and considering all fundamentals θ, the sufﬁcient
condition for convergence is













R(ps − pr)2 , for all θ ∈ R. (21)
In words, the variance of fundamentals should be large enough (or the density low enough)
to have convergence in continuation values for all reputation levels when reputation cannot
be modiﬁed. First, recall that this is a really stringent sufﬁcient condition, since the worst
combination of parameters are not jointly consistent. For example, if φ = 1 and V(z∗(φ)) = 0,
Pr(c) is not pr but ps, hence convergence conditions are effectively more relaxed. Second,
note the sufﬁcient condition for convergence is more stringent than the sufﬁcient condition
for uniqueness when βps > 0.5.
Step 2: Reputation formation:
Assume the sufﬁcient condition expressed in equation (21) is met. Then, there is a unique

































[V(z∗(φ))pr + (1 − V(z∗(φ)))ps].
It is straightforward to see
∂V(φ)
∂V(φ0) > 0. It is also possible to check monotonicity of continuation
values, since
∂V(φ)
∂V(φ0) < 1 when the sufﬁcient condition expressed in equation (21) is fulﬁlled.
With and without reputation formation extreme continuation values, V(0) and V(1)), are the
same. Since reputation generates a convex combination between unique values in a compact
set, the resulting continuation values V(φ) with reputation formation are also unique.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof As a ﬁrst step, assume convergence has been achieved (Proposition 4). Then z∗(φ) is
determined by equation (6) in the following way:
Z 1
0





V(φ0|φ, b x)db x − R(φ,z∗)

= 0.
































∂z∗ − (ps − pr)
∂R
















Pr(c)2 < 0 and ∂R
∂z∗ =
R(ps−pr)φv(z∗)
Pr(c)2 > 0 for all φ.











































V(φ0|b x)db x − V(φ)db x

.
To determine the sign of each derivative, I solve backward from the last period T. To do this,
we simply introduce period subscripts in all equations, particularly replacing V(φ) by Vt(φ)








T > 0 (from
condition in Proposition 1). Hence,
dz∗
T
dφ < 0. From equation (23),
dRT(φ)
dφ < 0. Finally, from
equation (24) (since VT+1 = 0 for all φ),
dVT(φ)
dφ > 0.
At period T − 1 we additionally have the effects coming from VT. From Bayesian learning
∂φ0
∂φ |b x =
pr[b xpr+(1−b x)ps]











∂φ db x > 0 and
dz∗
T−1
dφ < 0. From equation (23),
dRT−1(φ)
dφ < 0. Finally, it follows
that
dVT−1(φ)
dφ > 0 from equation (24) and from the fact that
∂VT(φ)
∂φ > 0 for all φ and that
R 1
0 VT(φ0|b x)db x can be written as a convex combination between VT(φ) and VT(φ0|b x = 0).
Following the same steps and solving backward until convergence,
dV(z∗(φ))




dφ < 0 and
dV(φ)
dφ > 0 for all φ ∈ [0,1]. Q.E.D.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 3





















In what follows, I assume a linear relation between payoffs and fundamentals, so the shape of
the cutoffs is not just an artiﬁce of the shape of the payoffs. Under this assumption, we have
∂2∆

































































2R(ps − pr)2(1 − V(z∗))2
Pr(c)3 > 0.
I will proceed in three steps. First, as a benchmark, I solve backward from T when reputa-
tion cannot be updated. Then, I show how reputation formation convexiﬁes the schedule of
cutoffs.
Step 1: No reputation formation: This is an artiﬁcial and expositionally convenient case in
which a ﬁrm is born with a given reputation and cannot change it (because age cannot be
observed, for example). I call the cutoffs in this case e z∗. In this case, beliefs b x do not play any
role,
∂φ0
∂φ = 1 and
∂2φ0
∂φ2 = 0 for all φ. Hence, equations (26) and (27) can be rewritten as
∂2∆t











∂φ2 = (V(e z∗










40At period T, since VT+1 = 0 for all φ, ∂2∆T
∂φ2 < 0 and ∂2VT
∂φ2 < 0. However, these signs do not
guarantee that equation (25) is positive. The sufﬁcient condition for
d2e z∗
T















T)] or, more generally, the variance of fundamentals is large
enough.21 The condition is more difﬁcult to be fulﬁlled for low values of φ.
At period, T − 1,
∂2∆T−1
∂φ2 < ∂2∆T
∂φ2 < 0 and
∂2VT−1
∂φ2 < ∂2VT
∂φ2 < 0. This means
d2e z∗
T−1
dφ2 > 0 for











∂φ2 , with ψ(e z∗) = V(e z∗)pr + (1 − V(e z∗))ps. Still it is
not clear that without reputation concerns d2e z∗
dφ2 > 0 for all φ, being more difﬁcult at lower
reputation levels.
Step 2: Reputation formation: Consider now the full model with reputation formation. This
leads to convexity, since it relates continuation values of different reputation levels. We con-
sider again equations (26) and (27).
At period T, as in step 1, ∂2∆T
∂φ2 < 0, ∂2VT











[pr+(ps−pr)(1−b x)φ]2 > 0 and
∂2φ0
∂φ2 = −
2pr(ps(1−b x)+prb x)(ps−pr)(1−b x)
[pr+(ps−pr)(1−b x)φ]3 < 0
for all b x ∈ [0,1]),
∂2∆T−1
∂φ2 < ∂2∆T
∂φ2 < 0 and
∂2VT−1
∂φ2 < ∂2VT















|b xdb x < ∂2VT












dφ2 for all φ.
Solving backward until convergence, reputation formation introduces pressure for concavity
of continuation values and hence the convexity of the schedule of cutoffs and interest rates at
all reputation levels, leading to d2z∗
dφ > d2e z∗






∂φ |φ=0 → ∞ and
∂2φ0
∂φ2 |φ=0 → ∞, hence
d2z∗
T−1
dφ2 > 0 for all φ (since it always
convexiﬁes the schedule of cutoffs for low reputation levels, which are the levels of reputation
where convexity was more difﬁcult to obtain without reputation formation). Hence, for any
reputation φ, there is always a
pr
ps(φ) ∈ (0,1] such that
d2z∗
T−1
dφ2 = 0. Furthermore, from the
condition in step 1,
pr
ps(φ) is weakly increasing in φ. Q.E.D.
A.6 Computational Procedure
We solve the model following the next procedure.
• Set a large grid of φ ∈ [0,1].
• Solve full information (FI) environment (efﬁciency).
21This condition requires some algebra that is available upon request.
41– Guess a VFI,0 = 0.
– Obtain θ∗
FI,0 from ∆(θ)FI = psΠs(θ) − prΠr(θ) + β(ps − pr)VFI,0 = 0.










– Use VFI,1 as the new guess and iterate until VFI,i − VFI,i−1 < ε.
• Solve the environment without (wo) reputation formation.
– Guess V(φ)wo,0 = 0 and θ∗(φ)0 = θ∗
FI for all φ.
– Obtain θ∗(φ)1 from ∆(φ,θ∗(φ)1) = 0, where
∆(φ,θ) = psΠs(θ) − prΠr(θ) + (ps − pr)[βV(φ)wo,0 − R(φ|θ∗(φ)0)].
– For each φ, obtain
V(φ)wo,1 =
R θ∗(φ)1
−∞ pr[Πr(θ) − R(φ|θ∗(φ)1)]v(θ)dθ +
R ∞
θ∗(φ)1 ps[Πs(θ) − R(φ|θ∗(φ)1)]v(θ)dθ
[1 − β(pr + V(θ∗(φ)1)(ps − pr))]
.
– Use V(φ)wo,1 and θ∗(φ)1 as new guesses and iterate until V(φ)wo,i−V(φ)wo,i−1 < ε1
and θ∗(φ)i − θ∗(φ)i−1 < ε2 for all φ.
• Solve the environment with reputation formation.
– Guess a V(φ)0 = 0 and z∗(φ)0 = θ∗(φ) for all φ.
– Using V(φ)0, for each belief b x ∈ [0,1] from a large grid of size Nx, obtain
∆(φ,z, b x|z∗(φ)0)0 = Ez[psΠs(θ) − prΠr(θ)] + (ps − pr)[βV(φ0|b x)0 − R(φ|z∗(φ)0)].
Recall that for σ → 0, this expression can be well approximated by
∆(φ,z, b x|z∗(φ)0)0 = psΠs(z) − prΠr(z) + (ps − pr)[βV(φ0|b x)0 − R(φ|z∗(φ)0)].




– For all θ < (>)z∗(φ)1, x(φ,θ)1 = 1(= 0).
∗ R(φ|z∗(φ)1) follows from z∗(φ)1.
∗ φ0 follows from x(φ,θ)1.








ps[Πs(θ) − R(φ|z∗(φ)1) + βV(φ0)0]v(θ)dθ.
– Use V(φ)1 and z∗(φ)1 as new guesses and iterate until V(φ)i − V(φ)i−1 < ε1 and
z∗(φ)i − z∗(φ)i−1 < ε2 for all φ.
42